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Abstract—Network traffic classification is used in various appli-
cations such as network traffic management, policy enforcement,
and intrusion detection systems. Although most applications en-
crypt their network traffic and some of them dynamically change
their port numbers, Machine Learning (ML) and especially
Deep Learning (DL)-based classifiers have shown impressive
performance in network traffic classification. In this paper, we
evaluate the robustness of DL-based network traffic classifiers
against Adversarial Network Traffic (ANT). ANT causes DL-
based network traffic classifiers to predict incorrectly using
Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) generating methods.
Since there is no need to buffer network traffic before sending
ANT, it is generated live. We partition the input space of the DL-
based network traffic classification into three categories: packet
classification, flow content classification, and flow time series
classification. To generate ANT, we propose three new attacks
injecting UAP into network traffic. AdvPad attack injects a
UAP into the content of packets to evaluate the robustness of
packet classifiers. AdvPay attack injects a UAP into the payload
of a dummy packet to evaluate the robustness of flow content
classifiers. AdvBurst attack injects a specific number of dummy
packets with crafted statistical features based on a UAP into a
selected burst of a flow to evaluate the robustness of flow time
series classifiers. The results indicate injecting a little UAP into
network traffic, highly decreases the performance of DL-based
network traffic classifiers in all categories.
Index Terms—Network Traffic Classification, Adversarial Net-
work Traffic, Adversarial Example.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, Internet traffic has grown due to theemergence of new applications and services in market.
Hence, management of network traffic is more challenging
than ever and the necessity of network traffic classification is
obvious in many cases, such as quality of service provision,
resource usage management, billing in ISPs, anomaly detection,
and Policy Enforcement systems. So far, three main approaches
to network traffic classification have been introduced, includ-
ing port-based, payload-based, and ML-based classification
[1]. Although port-based and payload-based approaches have
prevailed in many devices, an adversary can use random port
numbers or well-known port numbers to evade port-based
classifiers [2], and encrypt his/her network traffic or obfuscate
the pattern in the content of packets to evade payload-based
classifiers [1], [2].
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ML-based approaches utilize ML algorithms for network
traffic classification. The byte sequence and statistical features
of packets or flows are the most common features that are
used by ML-based network traffic classifiers. Although ML-
based approaches have been put forward with claims of fixing
the problems of previous approaches, the robustness of ML-
based classifiers has not been evaluated. In this paper, we will
investigate the robustness of such classifiers in a comprehensive
way. In recent years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), also
called Deep Learning (DL), have shown great success in solving
complex problems such as image classification [3], and speech
recognition [4]. These advances have motivated the researchers
to use DNNs in other domains, and recently, researchers have
demonstrated DNNs have promising results in network traffic
classification [5]–[10]. In this paper, we focus on DL-based
network traffic classifiers, which are state of the art in ML-
based network traffic classification.
Based on previous studies, we divide the input space of
DL-based network traffic classification into three categories:
Packet Classification (PC), Flow Content Classification (FCC),
and Flow Time Series Classification (FTSC). In PC, the
byte sequence of a packet is given to a classifier, and each
packet is labeled. In FCC, the byte sequence of the first
n packets of a flow is fed to a classifier, and the class of
each flow is predicted. In FTSC, the sequence of statistical
features of the first m packets of a flow, such as packets
size and inter-arrival times between packets, are passed to
a classifier, and each flow is classified. We consider two
classifiers in each input space category to assess the influence
of various items in the input of classifiers. In this paper, we
use One-Dimensional Convolutional Neural Networks (1D-
CNN) to classify ISCXVPN2016 dataset [11] in which multiple
application, including Skype, Facebook, and Hangouts generate
network traffic with various types. The target of network traffic
classification in this study is traffic characterization in which
the type of network traffic such as VoIP, streaming, email, and
chat is determined.
After the success of DNNs in various classification tasks,
their robustness has become the subject of much debate [12]–
[15]. In 2014, Szegedy et al. [12] have demonstrated that
DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are
maliciously crafted inputs that cause a classifier to make
a mistake. This vulnerability questioned the robustness of
DL-based classifiers in adversarial environment in which an
adversary can interfere in the training and the prediction
phases. In this paper, the robustness of DL-based network
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2traffic classifiers is challenged against Adversarial Network
Traffic (ANT). ANT is adversarially crafted network traffic in
which the content or the statistical features of network traffic
is perturbed.
There are two serious constraints to generate ANT. First,
in some types, such as VoIP, email, and chat, the content
and the statistical features of a flow are generated over time
and are dependent to the user, and there is no access to the
entire flow at the beginning of it. Second, a flow is generated
by two entities, and neither of them knows the content and
the statistical features of entire flow to make adversarial
perturbation based on it. According to these constraints, we use
Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) generating methods
to generate ANT. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [16] demonstrate that
there is a perturbation that, if it is added to a set of data, it will
cause DNNs to make incorrect predictions on most of them, and
this perturbation is not unique. In ANT, UAP is generated on a
pre-collected set of network traffic, and whenever a new flow
or a new packet is being sent, the pre-made UAP is injected
into it. This approach does not need to have access to the entire
data to make perturbation, and UAP is made beforehand on a
pre-collected set of network traffic. Consequently, ANT can be
generated live, and there is no need to buffer target network
traffic.
In this paper, three new attacks for generating ANT are pro-
posed, including Adversarial Pad (AdvPad) attack, Adversarial
Payload (AdvPay) attack, and Adversarial Burst (AdvBurst)
attack. AdvPad injects a UAP into the end or the start of
packets payload to evaluate the robustness of packet classifiers.
AdvPay injects a UAP into the payload of a dummy packet
at the first n packets of a flow to evaluate the robustness of
flow content classifiers. AdvBurst injects a specific number
of dummy packets with crafted statistical features based on a
UAP into the end of a selected burst of a flow to evaluate the
robustness of flow time series classifiers. Experiments show that
all classifiers are vulnerable to ANT, and by injecting a little
UAP into network traffic, the performance of DL-based network
traffic classifiers highly decreases. Results demonstrate that the
researchers should investigate the methods for improving the
robustness of DL-based network traffic classifiers.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Network traffic is formally defined, including packets,
unidirectional flows, bidirectional flows, and three input
space categories of DL-based network traffic classifiers.
• The influence of input space categories on the performance
and the robustness of DL-based network traffic classifiers
is investigated.
• Adversarial Network Traffic (ANT) is proposed to evaluate
the robustness of DL-based network traffic classifiers.
• Three new attacks are proposed to generate ANT, includ-
ing AdvPad, AdvPay, and AdvBurst attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
network traffic, and three input space categories of DL-based
network traffic classification are formally defined. Also, the
DNNs and basic methods for generating adversarial examples
are introduced. Sec. III reviews related works on DL-based
network traffic classification. In Sec. IV, ANT will be presented,
and AdvPad, AdvPay, and AdvBurst attacks are proposed. Sec.
V evaluates the robustness of classifiers in three input space
categories against three proposed attacks. Sec. VI discusses how
to use ANT in practice. Finally, in Sec. VII, the conclusions
of this work will be discussed.
II. BACKGROUND
Network traffic, DL-based classifiers, and adversarial exam-
ples are the fundamental constituents of the DL-based network
traffic classification and ANT. Accordingly, we introduce these
ingredients in the following subsections.
A. Formal Specification of Network Traffic
Network traffic consists of bidirectional flows and packets,
which are the common objects for network traffic classification.
Each packet consists of multiple headers and a payload in
which application data exists. We indicate the headers of a
packet by 5-tuple information, which stems from the content
of the IP layer and Transport Layer (TL) headers.
Definition 1. A packet Pi is a sequence of an IP layer header,
a TL header, and a payload.
Pi =< H
IP
pi , H
TL
pi , Paypi >,
HIPPi = (IP
src
Pi , IP
dst
Pi ),
HTLPi = (Port
src
Pi , Port
dst
Pi , P rotopi),
(1)
where IP srcPi and IP
dst
Pi
indicate source and destination IP
addresses of the packet, respectively. PortsrcPi and Port
dst
Pi
are
source and destination ports of the transport layer, respectively,
and Protopi is the transport layer protocol of the packet.
Unidirectional flow is a set of packets that share the same
source and destination information and transport layer protocol.
Definition 2. A unidirectional flow UFi is a set of an IP
layer header, a TL header, a timeout value, and a sequence of
packets.
UFi = {HIPUFi , HTLUFi , PUFi , T imeOutUFi},
HIPUFi = (IP
src
UFi , IP
dst
UFi),
HTLUFi = (Port
src
UFi , Port
dst
UFi , P rotoUFi),
PUFi =< P
i
1 , P
i
2 , ..., P
i
m >,
s.t. HIPP ij
= HIPUFi , H
TL
P ij
= HTLUFi , j ∈ [1,m],
IATP i
k+1
,P i
k
≤ T imeOutUFi , k ∈ [1,m− 1],
(2)
where m is the number of packets and IATP ik+1,P ik is inter-
arrival time between k and k + 1 packets of the unidirectional
flow UFi. IP srcUFi and IP
dst
UFi
are source and destination IP
addresses of UFi, respectively. PortsrcUFi and Port
dst
UFi
are
source and destination ports of the transport layer, respectively,
and ProtoUFi is the transport layer protocol of UFi. A
bidirectional flow is the union of two unidirectional flows,
where IP addresses and ports have switched.
Definition 3. A bidirectional flow BFi is the union of two
opposite unidirectional flows UFj and UFk.
BFi = UFj ∪ UFk,
s.t. IP srcUFj = IP
dst
UFk , IP
dst
UFj = IP
src
UFk ,
PortsrcUFj = Port
dst
UFk , Port
dst
UFj = Port
src
UFk ,
P rotoUFj = ProtoUFk , T imeOutUFj = T imeOutUFk .
(3)
We focus on bidirectional flow in this paper and use flow instead
of bidirectional flow in the rest of the paper for simplicity.
3B. ML-Based Network Traffic Classification
A ML-based classifier is a function f which maps an input
space X to an output space Y = {y1, ..., yk} where yi is ith
class, and k is the number of classes. In the training phase of
a classifier, we need to have a training set in which the true
class of each sample has been given {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where n is
the number of samples in the training set and yi is the true
class (label) of the sample xi. A good classifier generalizes to
unseen samples in the test set and classifies them correctly.
According to the previous studies, network traffic classi-
fication can be used in several domains, including protocol
detection, application identification, website and video finger-
printing, and traffic characterization. In this paper, we focus
on traffic characterization, which specifies the type of network
traffic, such as VoIP, streaming, file transferring, and email.
Traffic characterization is fundamental in many scenarios, such
as network traffic accounting, quality of service providing, and
policy enforcement.
We partition the input space of network traffic classification
into three categories: (i) packet classification (PC), (ii) flow
content classification (FCC), and (iii) flow time series classifi-
cation (FTSC). In what follows, each input space category will
be explained. Since the information in the header of the IP layer
is dependent on the machines that generate network traffic, we
do not consider IP header for network traffic classification.
Packet Classification (PC). In packet classification, the byte
sequence of a packet is given to a classifier, and it labels each
packet separately. Based on the literature, we consider two
versions of packet classification. In the first version (PC-HP),
TL header and payload, and in the later version (PC-P), only
payload of a packet is given to classifier. For packet Pi, we
have:
PC-HP Input for Pi: < HTLpi , Paypi >,
PC-P Input for Pi: <Paypi > .
(4)
Flow Content Classification (FCC). In this category, the
byte sequence of the first n packets of a flow is given to a
classifier, and each flow is labeled. FCC has two versions. In
the first version (FCC-HP), TL headers and payloads, and in
the second one (FCC-P), only payloads of the first n packets
of a flow are given to a classifier. To improve the performance
of classifiers, we multiply the sign of packet direction to the
content of that packet. The direction sign is considered positive
(+1) for packets from source (e.g., client) to destination (e.g.,
server) and negative (-1) for packets from destination to source.
For flow Fi, we have:
FCC-HP Input for Fi: < HTLpi0 ×Dpi0 , Paypi0 ×Dpi0 ,
..., HTLpin−1
×Dpin−1 , Paypin−1 ×Dpin−1 >,
FCC-P Input for Fi: < Paypi0 ×Dpi0 , ..., , Paypin−1 ×Dpin−1 >,
(5)
where Dpij ∈ {+1,−1} is jth packet direction of flow Fi.
Flow Time Series Classification (FTSC). In this category,
the statistical features of the first m packets of a flow are given
to a classifier. Two versions of FTSC have been considered
in the previous studies. In the first version (FTSC-IAT), inter-
arrival times between packets of a flow, and in the second
version (FTSC-PS), packets sizes of a flow are given to a
classifier in time-series format. Similar to FCC, we multiply
the sign of packets direction to the statistical features of packets
to improve the performance of the classifiers. For flow Fi, we
have:
FTSC-IAT Input for Fi: < IAT(pi0,pi1) ×Dpi1 , IAT(pi1,pi2)
×Dpi2 ,..., IAT(pim−2,pim−1) ×Dpim−1 >,
FTSC-PS Input for Fi: < PSpi0 ×Dpi0 , PSpi1 ×Dpi1 ,
..., PSpim−1
×Dpim−1 >,
(6)
where IAT(pij ,pik) is inter-arrival time between j
th and kth
packets, and PSpij is the size of j
th packet in flow Fi.
C. Deep Neural Networks
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are a function yi = fDNN (xi)
which takes an input xi ∈ X and returns an output yi ∈ Y .
DNNs act on raw data and do not need feature engineering.
Therefore, there is no need to have feature selection or an
expert who extracts the most salient features of network
traffic. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN), and Stacked Denoising Autoencoders (SDAE)
are the three main DNNs which have been used in network
traffic classification. Previous investigations [7], [8], [10], [17]
have demonstrated that the One-Dimensional Convolutional
Neural Network (1D-CNN) have delivered the best performance
in network traffic classification. In this paper, we use 1D-CNN
to classify network traffic.
Each neural network includes an input layer, multiple hidden
layers, and an output layer. Each layer consists of multiple
neurons that are connected to neurons in the adjacent layers.
Except for the input layer, the output of a given layer is
calculated through applying a nonlinear function on an obtained
value from multiplying the output of previous layer by the
weights matrix of that layer. A DNN assigns the label
yˆ = argmax
0≤i<k
fDNN (x)i to the input x, where fDNN (x)i is the
ith element of DNN output. In the training phase, weights
matrix of all layers θ are adjusted to minimize a loss function
J which measures the distance between predicted label yˆ and
the true label y. Hence, training is a minimization problem
on the weights of classifier. The output of the training phase
is θ∗ that minimizes the loss function J . Stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) and its versions are used for the minimization
of loss function in DNNs. Previous studies have used batch
normalization, dropout, and polling layers to improve the
performance of DNNs in network traffic classification. (For
more information, see [18]).
D. Adversarial Example
Although DNNs have achieved great success in solving
complex problems, they demonstrate serious vulnerability
against adversarial examples [12] [12]. An adversarial example
is a crafted input which causes the target classifier to make
a mistake. Suppose that a classifier f∗ assigns the true label
to each data and the target classifier of adversarial example
attack is f . For an adversarial example x′, we have:
f∗(x′) = y,
f(x′) = y′, s.t. y′ 6= y. (7)
The main method for creating an adversarial example is adding
an adversarial perturbation ξ to a real data x. In this method,
4it is supposed that after adding perturbation to data x, the true
class of x′ = x+ ξ and x must be the same. Given that a large
perturbation can change the true class of data, the amount of
perturbation has to be limited in many contexts such as, image
classification. The most common distant function is used in the
literature is Lp = ‖x′ − x‖p so that P -norm ‖.‖p is defined
as:
‖d‖p =
(D−1∑
i=0
|di|p
)1/p
(8)
where D is the dimension of data d and p ∈ [0,∞]. Generation
of an adversarial example can be formulated as a minimization
problem:
argmin
x′
∥∥x′ − x∥∥
p
s.t. f∗(x′) = y, f(x′) = y′, y′ 6= y, x′ ∈ Domain(x).
(9)
Goodfellow et al. [14] propose Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) attack to solve the minimization problem. The authors
use the gradient of DNN loss function to compute adversarial
perturbation, and L∞ to limit the size of perturbation. In FGSM,
adversarial perturbation is calculated as:
ξ = .sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)) (10)
where ∇xJ(θ, x, y) is the gradient of DNN loss function with
respect to input x.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [16] introduce the Universal Ad-
versarial Perturbation (UAP) attack, which is different from
previous attacks. In previous attacks, a perturbation is made for
each data. However, the UAP attack adds a single perturbation
ξu to a set of data and hops that they would be misclassified
with a high probability. To generate UAP, the authors used an
iterative algorithm in which iteration t > 0, a data x is sampled
from X and ξut−1 is added to the data x. Then, the perturbation
r is calculated using the following equation (ξu0 = 0).
rt = argmin
r
‖r‖2
s.t. func(x+ ξut−1 + r) 6= func(x).
(11)
To calculate ξut , rt is added to ξ
u
t−1 in each iteration, and a
projection function Pp,(v) is used which maps the input v to
a Lp ball of radius  and is centered at zero to ensure that the
constraint ‖ξu‖p <  is satisfied. Therefore:
ξut = Pp,(ξut−1 + rt). (12)
The authors have demonstrated that there is no need to have
much data to generate universal adversarial perturbation, and
this perturbation is not unique. In another work, Brown et al.
[15] propose universal adversarial image patch attack, which
injects a patch into an image and causes the classifier to predict
wrongly.
III. RELATED WORKS
The DL-based network traffic classification has been widely
studied in the literature. A brief review of previous studies is
provided in separate subsections and is summarized in Table I.
A. Packet Classification
Lotfollahi et al. present Deep Packet framework that embeds
SDAE and CNNs to classify ISCXVPN2016 network traffic
dataset [10]. The Deep Packet uses the byte sequence of
the transport layer header and the payload of packets to
classify packets. The results show that 1D-CNN classifier
has better overall performance than SDAE in both application
identification and traffic characterization, and the overall
accuracy of 1D-CNN in application identification is 98%, while
the precision in traffic characterization is 93%.
Wang et al. introduce a DL-based encrypted traffic classifier
called Datanet for better management of distributed smart home
networks [19]. In this study, after packets pre-processing and
removing the header of the Data-link layer, the byte sequence
of packets are fed into Datanet. Datanet uses ISCXVPN2016
dataset and gains F-measure ≥ 96% for both the SDAE and
CNN in distinguishing 15 applications.
B. Flow Content Classification
The first attempt to apply deep learning in network traffic
classification is reported by Z. Wang et al. [20]. They recognize
remarkable feature engineering ability of deep learning and try
to detect protocols in a TCP flow dataset by means of SDAE.
Their dataset consists of 300k pre-processed records in which
exist 1000 bytes of TCP payload. They achieve more than
90% recall in protocol detection for all protocols. W. Wang et
al. propose an end-to-end encrypted traffic classifier to traffic
characterization [17]. They use ISCXVPN2016 dataset and
extract only 728 bytes of each flow as the input. They achieve
the best result in the classification of the ISCXVPN2016
dataset compared to previous works that use the classical ML
algorithms.
After several studies in the domain of mobile application
identification [23], [24], Aceto et al. address mobile application
identification through the Deep Learning approach for the first
time [7]. They investigate type of input data that is fed into the
DL-classifier and consider three types of input data: (i) first
N bytes of payload in a flow, (ii) first N bytes of all headers
and payloads in a flow, and (iii) source and destination ports,
number of bytes in the transport-layer header, TCP window
size, inter-arrival time, and direction of packets in a flow. As the
best result, they achieve 83% overall accuracy for identifying
45 applications in both Android and iOS operating systems
on the first type of input data. Also, they demonstrate that the
overall performance of 1D-CNN and 2D-CNN are close in
mobile application identification and suggest that traffic should
be extracted by naturally considering data as one-dimensional.
In a similar work, Rezaei et al. propose a new DL-based
classifier to identify network traffic of mobile applications [21].
Their proposed classifier only needs the payload and statistical
features of the first few packets of flows and achieves between
84% to 98% overall accuracy for the identification of 80 popular
mobile applications.
C. Flow Time Series Classification
In [11], a set of time-related features such as duration of
flow, byte per second, and inter-arrival times between packets
is utilized to network traffic classification. They use C4.5 and
K-nearest neighbors as classification techniques and achieve
about 80% accuracy in the characterization of network traffics.
Moreover, they generate and distribute a labeled dataset of
encrypted network traffic is called ISCXVPN2016, which has
become a criterion in network traffic classification. In [6],
5Table I: Overview of previous studies.
Category Paper Input data Classifier Classification Target Year
P. Wang et al. [19] HIP ,HTL,payload SDAE, MLP, CNN Application identification 2018
PC
M. Lotfollahi et al. [10] HTL,payload SAE, CNN Application identification,
Traffic characterization
2020
Z. Wang et al. [20] HTL,payload SAE Protcol detection 2015FCC
W. Wang et al. [17] HIP ,HTL,payload CNN Traffic characterization 2017
S. Rezaie et al. [21] H
IP ,HTL,payload,
IAT ,PS,Dir
CNN, LSTM Application identification 2020
FCC-FTSC
G. Aceto et al. [7] H
IP ,HTL,payload,
IAT ,PS,Dir
SAE, CNN Application identification 2019
J. Caicedo-Munoz et al. [6] Time-related features Bagging, Boosting Traffic characterization 2018
G. Draper-Gi et al. [11] Time-related Features KNN, C4.5 Traffic characterizaion 2016
M. Lo´pez Martı´n et al. [5] PS,Dir,HTL LSTM, CNN Protcol detection 2017
K. Abe And S. Goto [22] Dir,IAT SDAE Website fingerprinting 2016
V. Rimmer et al. [9] Dir SDAE, CNN, LSTM Website fingerprinting 2018
FTSC
P. Sirinam et al. [8] Dir CNN Website fingerprinting 2018
authors improve the performance of [11], and achieve about
83% accuracy on ISCXVPN2016 dataset using bagging and
boosting classifiers. Lopez-Martin et al. [5] introduce a new
hybrid classifier based on CNN and RNN. In this work, each
flow comprises 20 packets. Regarding their results, whenever an
RNN is combined with a CNN, success rate slightly improves.
The process of identifying network traffic of visited websites
through privacy-enhancing technologies like Tor, which is also
known as Website Fingerprinting (WF), has a background as
long as encrypted traffic classification. Abe and Goto investigate
the effectiveness of DL-based classifiers in WF for the first time
[22]. In their experiment, network traffic of 100 websites that
passed through Tor is monitored, and the statistical feature of
each flow is extracted. They reveal that SDAE is useful in the
detection websites only using direction and inter-arrival times
of cells (Tor packets) with 86% success rate. Rimmer et al.
indicate that DL is an effective tool in automating the process of
features engineering, and their SDAE achieves 95.3% success
rate only using direction of Tor cells [9]. In another work,
Sirinam et al. design a deeper CNN classifier to outperform
earlier studies, which increase the success rate to 98% [8].
IV. ADVERSARIAL NETWORK TRAFFIC
Adversarial Network Traffic (ANT) evaluates the robustness
of DL-based network traffic classifiers, using the concept of
adversarial example attack. In adversarial example attack, an
adversary adds a little perturbation into the input data and
causes a classifier to make a false prediction. In the same
approach to deceive DL-based network traffic classifiers, ANT
injects a perturbation into network traffic. Most of adversarial
example attacks have been proposed in the context of image
processing, and they are not directly applicable in the context
of network traffic classification. There are some constraints to
apply adversarial example attacks in the context of network
traffic classification.
1) The content of packets must be preserved. If the con-
tent of a packet is modified, the functionality of the
application that uses the packet is disrupted. Hence, we
are not allowed to perturb the content of packets. The
perturbation can only be injected into some specific parts
of the input, such as the end of packets, or the content
of a dummy packet.
2) In conventional machine learning tasks, like image
classification, adversarial perturbation is made based on
the entire data. However, two entities make entire data
in the traffic classification task, and neither of them has
access to the entire data.
3) In some network traffic types, like chat, email, and VoIP,
the application that generates network traffic is not aware
of the content of network traffic at the beginning of a
flow, and the content of network traffic is dependent on
the user. Hence, there is no access to the entire flow
when the initial packets are being processed.
4) Making a perturbation for each packet or flow has high
computational overhead.
Based on such constraints, ANT uses Universal Adversarial
Perturbation (UAP) to cause the classifier to predict wrongly.
In this approach, there is no need to have access to the entire
new data to make adversarial perturbation, and there is no
need to compute one perturbation for each input. Also, UAP
is independent of the content of target data and is made on a
pre-collected set of data. To build UAP, first, a set of flows
or packets of the class from which we want to make UAP is
collected, and after crafting UAP, it is injected into the new
incoming network traffic of that class. For example, at the first
step, VoIP traffic are collected, then a UAP is made using a
pre-collected set of VoIP traffic. Afterwards, when a new VoIP
flow or packet is being sent, UAP is injected into it. Based on
the category of input space, the method of generating ANT
and applying UAP is different. Hence, we propose three new
attacks to evaluate the robustness of network traffic classifiers
which are explained afterwards.
In this paper, we assume adversary has white-box access
to DL-based classifiers. In the white-box setting, an adversary
knows the input space category, the architecture, the weights
of the deep learning classifier, and the outputs of the classifier.
6Nevertheless, Papernot et al. [25] have shown that adversarial
examples are transferable among different classifiers with
different training data set. In the black-box setting, an adversary
can use proposed attacks and run them on a substitute classifier,
which is close to the target classifier, and he/she uses the
generated perturbation to evade a target classifier.
A. Adversarial Pad Attack
We design adversarial pad (AdvPad) attack to reduce the
performance of two packet classifiers PC-HP, and PC-P. AdvPad
injects a UAP into the specific location of packets payload. We
only consider the start and the end of the payload of packets
for injecting adversarial pad and call them Start AdvPad and
End AdvPad Attacks, respectively. If UAP injects into the start
of the payload, the structure of an adversarially padded packet
Pi is as follows:
PC-HP Input for Pi: < HTLPi , AdvPad, PayPi >,
PC-P Input for Pi: <AdvPad, PayPi > .
(13)
If UAP injects into the end of the payload, the structure of an
adversarially padded packet Pi is as follows:
PC-HP Input for Pi: < HTLPi , PayPi , AdvPad >,
PC-P Input for Pi: <PayPi , AdvPad > .
(14)
Algorithm 1 shows the process of making UAP for the
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Pad
Input Packet set P of class l, packet classifier f1D−CNN with
weights θ, location of UAP LocAdvPad, overhead percentage OH ,
perturbation rate , number of iterations T , batch size batch size.
Output UAP ξ
1: ξ ← Rand(Domain(P ), Size = MaxPktSize)
2: for t← 0, T do
3: P batch ← sample batch size packets from P
4: for i← 0, batch size do
5: pad size← sizeof(pbatchi )×OH/100
6: ξ′ ← ξ[0 : pad size]
7: if LocAdvPad == Start and func == PC −HP then
8: pkt byte seqbatchi ←< HTLpbatchi , ξ
′, Paypbatchi
>
9: else if LocAdvPad == Start and func == PC − P then
10: pkt byte seqbatchi ←< ξ′, Paypbatchi >
11: else if LocAdvPad == End and func == PC −HP then
12: pkt byte seqbatchi ←< HTLpbatchi , Paypbatchi , ξ
′ >
13: else if LocAdvPad == End and func == PC − P then
14: pkt byte seqbatchi ←< Paypbatchi , ξ
′ >
15: end if
16: end for
17: ∆ξ ← ×∇ξJ(θ, pkt byte seqbatch, l)
18: ξ ← ClipDomain(P )(ξ + ∆ξ)
19: end for
20: return ξ
AdvPad attack. This algorithm has T iterations, which in each
iteration, a batch of packets are sampled from packets set P .
All packets in P has the same label l. For ith packet in the
batch of packets pbatch, UAP ξ is injected into the start or the
end of the payload, which the UAP location is specified by
LocAdvPad parameter. A bandwidth overhead parameter OH
is considered to control the bandwidth overhead of AdvPad
attack. OH determines the percentage of bandwidth overhead
that we want to add to each packet. Based on this parameter, we
add the first pad size bytes of ξ to a packet. In each iteration,
the perturbation ξ is updated based on the gradient of loss
function with respect to ξ, and  controls the magnitude of
changes in ξ. The function ClipDomain(P )(x) maps the input
x to the packets domain Domain(P ) by clipping features that
are not included.
B. Adversarial Payload Attack
Adversarial payload (AdvPay) attack aims to deceive two
flow content classifiers FCC-HP, and FCC-P, through adding
UAP to the payload of a dummy packet. In AdvPay attack, a
dummy packet is injected into a specified location k ∈ [0, n−1]
among the first n packets of a flow, and UAP is injected
into it. The direction of the dummy packet can be arbitrary;
nonetheless, we choose the direction of the last packet before
the dummy Packet Dpik−1 as the direction of the dummy packet.
The input of FCC-HP, and FCC-P for flow Fi are changed as
follows:
FCC-HP Input for Fi: < HTLP i0 ×Dpi0 , PayP i0 ×Dpi0 , ...,
HTLP i
k
×Dpi
k−1
, AdvPayP i
k
×Dpi
k−1
,
..., HTLP in−2
×Dpin−2 , PayP in−2 ×Dpin−2 >,
FCC-P Input for Fi: < PayP i0 ×Dpi0 , ...,
AdvPayP i
k
×Dpi
k−1
,..., PayP in−2
×Dpin−2 > .
(15)
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Payload
Input Flow set F of class l, flow content classifier f1D−CNN
with weights θ, dummy packet index vector INDAdvpay , UAP size
AdvPaySize, perturbation rate , number of iterations T , batch size
batch size.
Output UAP ξ
1: ξ ← zeros(Size = AdvPaySize)
2: for t← 0, T do
3: F batch ← sample batch size flows from F
4: INDbatch ← dummy packet index of F batch in INDAdvpay
5: for i← 0, batch size do
6: f byte seqbatchi ← <>
7: for j ← 0, n− 1 do
8: if j < INDbatchi then
9: append(f byte seqbatchi , < P
F batchi
j ×D
F batchi
j >)
10: else if j == INDbatchi then
11: append(f byte seqbatchi , <
dummy packet with payload ξ ×DF
batch
i
j−1 >)
12: else if j > INDbatchi then
13: append(f byte seqbatchi , < P
F batchi
j−1 ×D
F batchi
j−1 >)
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: ∆ξ = ×∇ξJ(θ, f byte seqbatch, l)
18: ξ = ClipDomain(F )(ξ + ∆ξ)
19: end for
20: return ξ
Algorithm 2 generates UAP that is used as an adversarial
payload in this attack. In FCC-HP, the flow set F consists of the
transport layer header and the payload of packets, and in FCC-P,
it only consists of the payload of packets. Dummy packet index
vector INDAdvPay is considered to determine the location of
the dummy packet in the flow. For example, it can be the first
or the second packet from source to destination or any other
location in the first n packets of a flow. Algorithm 2 has T
iterations, and in each iteration, batch size flows from the flow
set F is sampled F batch and then the index of dummy packets
of flows in F batch is assigned to INDbatch. For flow i in
F batch, the place of dummy packet is determined by INDbatchi
7and a dummy packet that carries UAP ξ with size AdvPaySize
bytes is injected into that place in the byte sequence of flow
f byte seqbatchi . In each iteration, ξ is updated based on the
gradient of loss function with respect to ξ and  tunes the size
of change in ξ. The function ClipDomain(F ) maps ξ to the
domain of byte sequence of flows by clipping the value of ξ
and controls the direction sign of dummy packet.
C. Adversarial Burst Attack
The flow time series contains the statistical features of
packets in the order which they are received. A burst in a
flow is a sequence of consecutive packets in one direction. The
inputs FTSC-IAT and FTSC-PS for flow Fi can be expressed
using the concept of bursts as follows:
FTSC-IAT and FTSC-PS Inputs for Fi:
< (Brsi0, D
i
0), (Brs
i
1, D
i
1),..., (Brs
i
n, D
i
n) >
s.t. Dij ∈ {−1,+1}, Dij = −1×Dij+1, j ∈ [0, n− 1],
(16)
where n is the number of bursts in flow Fi and (Brsij , D
i
j) is
defined as follows:
(Brsij , D
i
j) for FTSC-PS:
< PS
p
j
0
×D
p
j
0
, PS
p
j
1
×D
p
j
1
,..., PS
p
j
m
×D
p
j
m
>,
(Brsij , D
i
j) for FTSC-IAT: < IAT(p(j−1)
m′ ,p
j
0)
×D
p
j
0
,
IAT
(p
j
0,p
j
1)
×D
p
j
1
, ...,IAT
(p
j
m−1,p
j
m)
×D
p
j
m
>,
s.t. D
p
j
k
∈ {−1,+1}, D
p
j
k
= Dij , k ∈ [0,m],
(17)
where m is the number of packets in the Brsij , p
(j−1)
m′ is the
last packet of Brsi(j−1) and if j = 0 then the IAT(p(j−1)
m′ ,p
j
0)
will be 0. In Adversarial Burst (AdvBurst) attack, multiple
dummy packets with crafted statistical features are added to the
end of a selected burst of a flow. First, a burst Brsis from the
flow Fi is selected, and then, d dummy packets are appended
to the end of it. The direction of dummy packets and the
selected burst Brsis is the same. The sequence of dummy
Algorithm 3 Adversarial Burst
Input Flow set F of class l, flow content classifier f1D−CNN with
weights θ, selected burst indices vector INDSBurst, number of dummy
packets Num of dummy pkts, perturbation rate , number of
iterations T , batch size batch size.
Output UAP ξ
1: ξ ← Rand(Domain(F ), Size = Num of dummy pkts)
2: for t← 0, T do
3: F batch ← sample batch size flows from F
4: INDbatch ← selected burst index of F batch in INDSBurst
5: for i← 0, batch size do
6: flows time seriesbatchi ← flow to burst seq(F batchi )
7: Brsis = flows time series
batch
i [IND
batch
i ]
8: Brsiadv = append(Brs
i
s, ξ)
9: flows time seriesbatchi [IND
batch
i ] = Brs
i
adv
10: end for
11: ∆ξ = ×∇ξJ(θ, flows time seriesbatch, l)
12: ξ = ClipDomain(F )(ξ + ∆ξ)
13: end for
14: return ξ
packets < pdummy1 , p
dummy
2 , ..., p
dummy
d > and the selected
burst Brsis build a new burst which is called adversarial burst
Brsiadv. After applying the AdvBurst attack, the structure of
flow Fi is as follows:
Fi: < (Brsi0, D
i
0), (Brs
i
1, D
i
1), ...,
(Brsis−1,D
i
s−1), (Brs
i
adv, D
i
s), ..., (Brs
i
n, D
i
n) >,
(18)
where (Brsiadv, D
i
s) for FTSC-IAT and FTSC-PS is defined
as follows:
(Brsiadv, D
i
s) for FTSC-PS: < PSps0 ×Dps0 , ..., PSpsm×
Dpsm , PSpdummy0
×Dis, ..., PSpdummy
d
×Dis >,
(Brsiadv, D
i
s) for FTSC-IAT: < IAT(p(s−1)
m′ ,p
s
0)
×Dps0 ,
..., IAT(psm−1,psm) ×Dpsm ,IAT(psm,pdummy0 ) ×D
i
s, ...,
IAT
(p
dummy
d−1 ,p
dummy
d
)
×Dis, >,
(19)
where Brsis is the selected burst, and m is the number of
packets in the selected burst. Algorithm 3 generates UAP that
AdvBurst attack uses as the statistical features of dummy
packets. To specify the place of adversarial burst in each
flow, this algorithm gets the selected burst indices vector
INDSBurst, which determines the indices of the selected burst
in each flow. Algorithm 3 runs in T iterations. In each iteration,
batch size number of flows are sampled F batch, and the
selected burst indices of these flows is assigned to INDbatch.
For flow i in F batch, first, the flow is transformed into burst
sequences flows time seriesbatchi , and then the selected
burst Brsis is replaced by the adversarial burst Brs
i
adv , which
the index of selected burst Brsis is determined by IND
batch
i .
The number of dummy packets that are added to the end
of the selected burst is specified by Num of dummy pkts
parameter. The parameter ξ is updated according to the gradient
of loss function with respect to ξ, and  controls the rate of
change in ξ. The function ClipDomain(F ) makes sure that
the perturbation ξ is in the domain of statistical features of
flows, and the sign of ξ is the same as the direction of dummy
packets.
V. EVALUATION
Three attacks have been proposed in order to evaluate the
robustness of the DL-based network traffic classifiers with
respect to the three categories of input space. In this section, the
robustness of six different classifiers is examined against ANT.
Moreover, the robustness of classifiers that get the transport
layer header as the input, PC-HP and FCC-HP, are evaluated
against port attack. In port attack, source and destination port
numbers of flows are randomly assigned from a specific range
of port numbers.
Typical performance metrics for evaluating a classifier are
precision, recall, and F-score. The recall shows what fraction of
given class data is classified correctly. Since proposed attacks
cause the classifiers to misclassify data of a given class, we
focus on recall in the evaluation section.
A. Dataset
DL-based network traffic classifiers need to be trained using
a labeled set of network traffic in the training phase. To the best
of our knowledge, a few studies have a reliable labeling process,
and some of them have not enough data to train a deep neural
network. Draper et al. [11] have presented ISCXVPN2016
dataset that consists of six types of network traffic, and some
of flows in the dataset have been sent through a VPN. They
used different applications, such as Skype, Facebook, Hangouts,
8Table II: Packet classification dataset.
Imbalanced Dataset Balanced DatasetType
Total Number Training Set Total Number Training Set
Chat 68,864 41,646 68,864 41,646
Email 30,807 18,558 51,849 39,600
FileTransfer 313,916 188,349 100,796 60,505
Streaming 124,487 74,692 100,158 60,023
Torrent 162,479 97,487 101,164 60,625
VoIP 596,476 357,885 100,432 60,018
Youtube, and Bittorent, to generate traffic with different types,
including chat, email, file transfer, streaming, torrent, and VoIP.
This dataset has been labeled based on application and type,
which have generated given network traffic. This dataset is
highly imbalanced and it decreases the performance of DL-
based classifiers. We use undersampling for classes having
more data and oversampling for classes having fewer data
to overcome this challenge [26]. In undersampling, a certain
amount of data is uniformly sampled from a class and is put
on the dataset. In oversampling, a certain amount of data from
a class in the dataset is uniformly sampled and is replicated
in the dataset until the amount of data for that class reaches
a specific number. The dataset is split into training (60%),
validation (20%), and test sets (20%).
B. Packet Classification
In this section, the robustness of packet classifiers against
port and adversarial pad (AdvPad) attacks is evaluated. We
propose a random pad attack (RandPad) as a baseline to assess
the effectiveness of the AdvPad attack. RandPad injects a
random pad into the payload of packets. AdvPad must have a
better performance than RandPad . In the AdvPad attack, for
a given class, Algorithm 1 generates a UAP on the packets of
that class in the validation set with the desired percentage of
bandwidth overhead, and then the UAP is injected into packets
of that class in the test set, and the performance of packet
classifiers is evaluated against these packets.
1) Packet Classification Dataset: Packet classification
dataset consists of the byte sequence of packets that have
at least one byte of payload. Since the decimal domain of each
byte of a packet is in the [0,255] interval, we divide the decimal
value of each byte by 255 to normalize the byte sequence of
packets. Hence, each packet becomes a sequence of numbers
between zero and one. Also, we need to add zero pad to the end
of packets until their length reaches to MaxPktSize. Table
II shows the number of samples in each class.
2) Packet classifiers Setup: A 1D-CNN is used to classify
the byte sequences of packets. Given our computational
resources, we trained 50 1D-CNNs with different architectures
and hyper-parameters, and finally, the classifier with higher
accuracy on the validation set has been selected. The overall
accuracy of PC-HP and PC-P is 88.09% and 66.71%, respec-
tively. The precision, recall, and F-score of these classifiers
are reported in Table III. PC-HP has higher performance than
PC-P because of the information in the transport layer header
of packets.
3) Packet Classifiers Robustness Evaluation: AdvPad, Rand-
Pad, and port attack are applied to packet classifiers to evaluate
Table III: Performance metrics of the packet classifiers PC-HP, and
PC-P.
Precision(%) Recall(%) F-score(%)Type
PC-HP PC-P PC-HP PC-P PC-HP PC-P
Chat 85.35 74.11 76.45 47.31 80.66 57.75
Email 65.77 59.97 75.35 69.84 70.23 64.53
FileTransfer 98.41 67.51 90.23 77.19 94.14 72.03
Streaming 79.96 48.08 91.50 41.88 85.34 44.77
Torrent 99.3 69.66 99.97 77.33 99.63 73.29
VoIP 87.24 76.33 84.47 85.15 85.83 80.50
their robustness. AdvPad has been conducted for 1000 iterations
with batch size = 128 and  = 0.01. RandPad has been run
50 times, and the average results are reported in this section.
Figure 1 shows the recall of PC-HP under proposed attacks
for the various magnitude of BandWidth (BW) overhead for
all classes.
Port attack randomly changes the transport layer port
numbers of flows, and it does not impose any BW overhead
on network traffic. The recall of chat, email, and streaming
classes decreases considerably under port attack that shows
PC-HP is highly sensitive to the transport layer port numbers
for classifying these classes. However, the port attack has little
effect on the recall of other classes.
End AdvPad considerably decreases the recall of PC-HP in
most classes with little bandwidth overhead, and recall is more
decreased by increasing the size of the adversarial pad. If it com-
bines with port attack (End AdvPad+Port), the performance of
attack is raised in most classes. End RandPad injects a random
pad at the end of packets payload, and End RandPad+Port
combines End RandPad with port attack. End AdvPad and
End AdvPad+Port have better performance than End RandPad
and End RandPad+Port attacks, respectively. This observation
shows the effectiveness of the AdvPad attack.
Start AdvPad reduces the recall of all classes to under
25% with just 10% bandwidth overhead. The recall of PC-
HP under Start AdvPad gets close to 0% by increasing the
size of adversarial pad. Adding Port attack to Start AdvPad
(Start AdvPad+Port) does not improve the performance of
Start AdvPad in most classes. In the Start RandPad attack,
a random pad is injected into the start of packets payload,
and Start RandPad+port mixes Start RandPad with port attack.
There is a significant gap between the recall of PC-HP under
Start AdvPad and Start RandPad, and also, there is a large
gap between the recall of PC-HP under Start AdvPad+port
and Start RandPad+port. These gaps show the remarkable
effectiveness of the adversarial pad at the start of packets
for all classes. The recall of PC-HP under Start AdvPad and
Start AdvPad+Port is reduced more than the End AdvPad
and the End AdvPad+Port for all classes, respectively. These
observations show PC-HP is more sensitive to the information
at the start of packets payload than the information at the
end of it. The recall of PC-HP under the End RandPad and
Start RandPad are very analogous to each other in some classes.
The performance of random pad attacks is lower than the
End AdvPad and the End AdvPad+Port attacks in most classes.
These results show the effectiveness of adversarial pad attacks.
Figure 1b indicates the recall of PC-P under proposed attacks
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Figure 1: The recall of PC-HP (a) and PC-P (b) under different attacks over various sizes of BandWidth (BW) overhead for all classes. The
legends show various kinds of attacks that have been applied.
for different magnitudes of BW overhead for all classes. The
performance of the End AdvPad is variable in various classes.
Although the decline of recall of PC-P under the End AdvPad
is low in file transfer and chat classes, the End AdvPad highly
decreases the recall of PC-P in other classes. The recall of PC-
P under the End RandPad is a little higher than the recall of
PC-P under the End AdvPad in most classes, which indicates
low effectiveness of the End AdvPad on PC-P. Start AdvPad
significantly decreases the recall of PC-P and indicates the best
performance among all attacks on PC-P. It decreases the recall
of all classes to less than 3% with just 30% BW overhead.
Start AdvPad has better performance than Start RandPad in
all classes. In some classes such as VoIP, email, chat, and
file transfer, the recall of PC-P under the Start RandPad is
close or lower than recall of PC-P under the End AdvPad.
This observation demonstrates PC-P is very sensitive to the
information at the start of packets.
C. Flow Content Classification
We evaluate the robustness of flow content classifiers against
adversarial payload (AdvPay) attack. Also, we propose Random
Payload (RandPay) attack as a baseline attack to show the
effectiveness of the AdvPay attack. In the RandPay attack,
a dummy packet that carries a payload with a random byte
sequence is injected into the first n packets of a flow. In the
AdvPay attack, for a given class, Algorithm 2 generates a UAP
with the desired size on flows of that class in the validation set,
then for each flow of that class in the test set, this perturbation is
injected into the payload of a dummy packet, and the robustness
of flow content classifiers is evaluated against them.
1) Flow Content Classification Dataset: Similar to packet
classification, the decimal value of each byte is divided by 255
to normalize the byte sequence of packets between zero and
Table IV: Flow content classification dataset.
Imbalanced Dataset Balanced DatasetType
Total Number Training Set Total Number Training Set
Chat 536 321 1174 959
Email 392 235 1116 959
FileTransfer 1420 852 1527 959
Streaming 1114 668 1405 959
Torrent 400 240 1119 959
VoIP 1598 959 1598 959
one, and then, zero pad is added to the end of packets until
their length reaches to MaxPktSize. Afterwards, the byte
sequences of the first n packets of a flow which have at least
one byte of payload are concatenated together, and this new
sequence is called flow byte sequence. Table IV indicates the
number of samples in each class before and after oversampling.
2) Flow Content Classifiers Setup: A 1D-CNN is used to
classify the byte sequence of flows. Given our Computational
resource, 150 1D-CNN with various architectures and hyperpa-
rameters have been explored to find the best classifier for FCC.
Eventually, the classifier with higher accuracy on the validation
set has been chosen. Based on experiments, we chose 10
packets to be in each flow byte sequence. The overall accuracy
of FCC-HP and FCC-P is 81.52% and 80.6%, respectively.
Other performance metrics of these classifiers are presented
in Table V. The results demonstrate that the influence of the
header of transport layer on FCC is low, and even in some
classes, the performance of FCC-P is better than FCC-HP.
3) Flow Content Classifiers Robustness Evaluation: AdvPay,
RandPay, and port attack have been applied to flow content
classifiers to evaluate their robustness. AdvPay attack has been
run for 1000 iterations with batch size = 64 and  = 0.001.
The dummy packet is injected after the first packet from source
(e.g., client) to destination (e.g., server). RandPay attack has
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Figure 2: The recall of FCC-HP (a) and FCC-P (b) under different attacks over various sizes of adversarial payload for all classes. The
legends show various kinds of attacks that have been applied.
Table V: Performance metrics of the flow content classifiers FCC-HP,
and FCC-P.
Precision(%) Recall(%) F-score(%)Type
FCC-HP FCC-P FCC-HP FCC-P FCC-HP FCC-P
Chat 73.26 74.39 58.88 57.01 65.29 64.55
Email 89.04 85.37 82.28 88.61 85.53 86.96
FileTransfer 85.17 90.23 86.97 84.51 86.06 87.28
Streaming 79.82 74.69 81.61 82.06 80.71 78.25
Torrent 98.7 97.47 95.00 96.25 96.81 96.86
VoIP 76.11 73.75 80.62 78.12 78.30 75.87
been conducted 50 times, and the average results are reported
in this section.
Figure 2a shows the recall of FCC-HP under AdvPay,
RandPay, and port attack over various sizes of adversarial
payload for all classes. The recall of FCC-HP under port attack
is slightly reduced, which shows FCC-HP does not rely too
much on the information of the port numbers of transport layer
header. The recall of all classes under AdvPay attack drops
to less than 3.52% with just 500 bytes of adversarial payload.
AdvPay+Port combines AdvPay with port attack. It increases
the performance of the AdvPay attack a little bit and decreases
the recall of all classes under AdvPay+Port to less than 1.41%
with just 500 bytes of adversarial payload. The RandPay attack
injects a dummy packet that carries a random byte sequence as
the payload into a flow. Similar to AdvPay, the dummy packet is
sent after the first packet from source to destination. Although
the performance of RandPay is good, AdvPay attack has
much better performance. RandPay+Port combines RandPay
with port attack. The performance of RandPay+Port is very
close to RandPay. Unlike AdvPay, by increasing the size of
adversarial payload, the recall of FCC-HP under RandPay and
RandPay+Port remains relatively fixed. However, the recall
of FCC-HP under AdvPay and AdvPay+Port is decreased by
increasing the size of adversarial payload.
Figure 2b indicates the recall of FCC-P under AdvPay and
RandPay over various sizes of adversarial payload for all classes.
Except for the torrent class, the recall for all classes under
AdvPay drops off to almost 0% with 1000 or fewer bytes of
adversarial payload. The recall of the torrent class decreases
to 0% with 1400 bytes adversarial payload. RandPad has poor
performance on FCC-P in most classes, and by increasing the
size of adversarial payload, the performance of RandPay does
not improve very much. This observation demonstrates the
effectiveness of the AdvPay attack on FCC-P. Although FCC-P
has almost 1% less overall accuracy than FCC-HP, results in
Figure 2 indicate FCC-P is slightly more robust than FCC-
HP, and for reducing the performance of FCC-P, the size of
adversarial payload needs to be increased more.
D. Flow Time Series Classification
We evaluate the robustness of flow time series classifiers
against adversarial burst (AdvBurst) attack. Also, we conduct
RandBurst on these classifiers to evaluate the effectiveness of
the AdvBurst attack. In the RandBurst attack, the statistical
features of dummy packets are randomly perturbed. AdvBurst
must have better performance than RandBurst. AdvBurst using
Algorithm 3 generates a UAP with a specific size on the flows
of a given class in the validation set. Then, this perturbation
is used as the statistical feature of dummy packets, which are
appended to the end of selected bursts of flows of that class
in the test set, and the robustness of classifiers is evaluated
against these flows.
1) Flow Time Series Classification Dataset: The number
of samples in the dataset of FTSC is very close to the FCC
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Table VI: Performance metrics of the flow time series classifiers
FTSC-PS, and FTSC-IAT.
Precision(%) Recall(%) F-score(%)Type
FTSC-PS FTSC-IAT FTSC-PS FTSC-IAT FTSC-PS FTSC-IAT
Chat 58.25 65.22 58.25 58.25 58.25 61.54
Email 92.21 85.54 89.87 89.87 91.02 87.65
FileTransfer 80.00 80.95 76.60 78.37 78.26 79.64
Streaming 78.28 75.00 71.10 70.18 74.52 72.51
Torrent 88.24 90.24 93.75 92.50 90.91 91.36
VoIP 70.85 71.39 77.39 77.81 73.98 74.46
dataset (Table IV). The packets size data are normalized as
follows:
Normalized PacketSize =
PacketSize− µPktSize
StdPktSize
(20)
where µPktSize, and StdPktSize indicate mean and standard
deviation of packets size data, respectively. The IAT data are
as follows:
Normalized IAT = 2× log(IAT+1µSec)IATmax (21)
where IATmax is the maximum of IAT data.
2) Flow Time Series Classifiers Setup: A 1D-CCN is
used to classify flow time series. Given our computational
resource, we have explored 150 different architectures and
hyperparameters to build the final flow time series classifier.
Based on experiments, we chose 100 packets to be in the
time series of each flow. The overall accuracy of FTSC-PS
and FTSC-IAT is 76.21% and 76.51%, respectively. The other
performance metrics of these classifiers are reported on Table
VI. Based on our experiments, FTSC-IAT has a little bit better
performance than FTSC-PS.
3) Flow Time Series Classifiers Robustness Evaluation:
AdvBurst and RandBurst have been applied to flow time series
classifiers to evaluate their robustness. AdvBurst attack has
been conducted for 2000 iterations with batch siz = 64 and
 = 0.01. RandBurst has been conducted 50 times, and the
average results are reported in this section. The domain of IAT
is between 0 and 180 seconds with microsecond granularity. If
the IAT domain of dummy packets be equal to the domain of
IAT in the dataset, AdvBurst can impose high time overhead on
a flow. Therefore, we limit the IAT domain of dummy packets
between 0.001 and 0.1 seconds, and this restriction is applied
using the clip function in Algorithm 3.
We choose the first burst from source to destination as
the selected burst in all flows to attack FTSC-PS. Figure 3a
shows the recall of FTSC-PS under AdvBurst and RandBurst
over different numbers of dummy packets for all classes.
The RandBurst attack appends dummy packets with random
statistical features at the end of the selected bursts. AdvBurst
highly decreases the recall of FTSC-PS in all classes with
just a few dummy packets. In chat, email, and torrent classes,
the recall of FTSC-PS under AdvBurst drops to less than
11.65% using just five dummy packets. Also, RandBurst shows
excellent performance in these classes. Although AdvBurst
has better performance on these classes, results show those
classes are highly vulnerable to little manipulation in the size
of dummy packets, and even dummy packets with random
packet sizes can highly decrease the recall for these classes. In
contrast, although the performance of AdvBurst in file transfer,
streaming, and VoIP classes, is not as fine as those classes, the
distance between the recall of FTSC-PS under AdvBurst and
RandBurst is large. This observation indicates the effectiveness
of AdvBurst in these classes.
We consider the first burst from destination to source in a
flow as the selected burst to attack on FTSC-IAT. Figure 3b
shows the recall of FTSC-IAT under AdvBurst and RandBurst
for all classes. AdvBurst highly reduces the recall of FTSC-IAT
for all classes with just a few dummy packets. However, its
performance is various in different classes. The recall of FTSC-
IAT under AdvBurst becomes less than 16.4% for chat, torrent,
and VoIP classes with just seven dummy packets. AdvBurst
needs more dummy packets to highly decrease the recall of
FTSC-IAT for email and file transfer classes. Although the
performance of AdvBurst on FTSC-IAT is fine enough, the
gap between the recall of FTSC-IAT under AdvBurst and
RandBurst is relatively small in most classes. We think the
effectiveness of AdvBurst has decreased because of the domain
of IAT has been limited between 0.001 and 0.1 seconds, and
this domain is remarkably shorter than the real domain of IAT
in the dataset. The recall of streaming class under AdvBurst has
a strange behavior by increasing the number of dummy packets.
The recall decreases continuously until the seventh dummy
packet is added, and it begins to rise after that. We think the
reason for this behavior is that the size of the burst heading
from destination to source is often large in streaming class, and
when the size of adversarial burst gets increased by increasing
the number of dummy packets, FTSC-IAT recognizes these
flows as streaming.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the image classification domain, humans determine the
true class of image, and adversarial perturbation must be
imperceptible to humans and does not change the true class of
a sample. However, in network traffic classification, the true
class of network traffic is determined by the application that
generates and receives that network traffic. If the functionality
of the application does not disrupt, the true class of network
traffic is preserved. Proposed attacks change the content of
network traffic to evade DL-based network traffic classifiers.
However, since they do not change or remove the content of
original network traffic, it can be retrieved. There are two
approaches to retrieve original network traffic from perturbed
network traffic. First, applications that generate and receive
network traffic must be aware of the perturbation being added
to network traffic and must remove this perturbation to retrieve
original network traffic. Second, there must be a proxy to
add or remove perturbation to network traffic. This proxy can
be in the adversary’s device or middleware in the adversary’
network. The second approach is more convenient and is
independent of applications that generate and receive network
traffic. Although some proposed attacks may not be applicable
to any network situations, they have the potential to adapt to
the various network situations by a little change. For example,
when a firewall in the adversary’s network only passes the
encrypted flows that start with SSL/TLS handshake packets, the
adversarial pad can only be added to the end of the handshake
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Figure 3: The recall of FTSC-PS (a) and FTSC-IAT (b) under different attacks over various number of dummy packets for all classes. The
legends show various kinds of attacks that have been applied.
packets, or dummy packet can be added after the handshake
packets.
Previous studies [5]–[7], [10], [11], [19], [21], [23] have
demonstrated that approaches being used to evade payload-
based and port-based classifiers are not effective against the
DL-based network traffic classifier. For example, although
ISCXVPN2016 dataset consists of encrypted and tunneled
network traffic, it is classified by the ML-based classifiers
with high accuracy in this study an previous studies [5], [6],
[10], [11], [19]. Similarly, in website fingerprinting attack,
although the network traffic is generated by privacy-enhancing
technologies such as Tor, it can be classified with high accuracy
using time-series features of flows [8], [9]. Therefore proposed
attacks have only focused on the evading of the DL-based
network traffic classifiers, and if an adversary also wants to
evade port-based or payload-based network traffic classifiers,
(s)he must use appropriate approaches such as dynamic port
assignment, payload encryption, or tunneling mechanism along
with our proposed approaches to evade these classifiers.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the robustness of DL-based network traffic
classifiers against Adversarial Network Traffic (ANT) has been
evaluated. Because of using universal adversarial perturbation
generating methods in ANT, there is no need to have access to
target network traffic in advance, and it is generated live. Based
on the literature, we considered three input space categories
in DL-based network traffic classification, including packet
classification, flow content classification, and flow time series
classification. Based on these categories, we proposed three
new attacks to make ANT. The results indicate the robustness of
network traffic classifiers in all input space categories are very
low in facing ANT, and also, their performance considerably
decreases by little random perturbation. The Robustness of
DL-based network traffic classifiers is a critical issue, and
by continuing researches in this area, we aim to increase the
robustness of these classifiers.
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